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Abstract
We analyze the formation of networks among individuals. In particular, we
examine the existence of networks that are stable against changes in links by
any coalition of individuals. We show that to investigate the existence of such
strongly stable networks one can restrict focus on a component-wise egalitarian
allocation of value. We show that when such strongly stable networks exist they
coincide with the set of efficient networks (those maximizing the total productive
value). We show that the existence of strongly stable networks is equivalent to
core existence in a derived cooperative game and use that result to characterize
the class of value functions for which there exist strongly stable networks via a
“top convexity” condition on the value function on networks. We also consider a
variation on strong stability where players can make side payments, and examine
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situations where value functions may be non-anonymous – depending on player
labels.
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1 Introduction
The importance of networks in a variety of social and economic settings is well-
documented. Applications range from social networks such as friendships to more
directly economically motivated ones such as trading alliances, decentralized market
relationships, research partnerships, etc. Given that network relationships matter, it
is important to understand which networks are likely to form and how this depends
on the structure of the setting. In particular, there has been a good deal of recent
research into understanding how networks form among a group of individuals (people,
firms, etc.) who have the discretion to choose with whom they interact.1
In this paper, we continue that line of research through a careful study of the
existence and properties of strongly stable networks: those networks which are stable
against changes in links by any coalition of individuals. Strongly stable networks are
those which are supported by strong Nash equilibria of an appropriate game of network
formation.
There are many reasons for studying a strong notion of stability based on coalitional
considerations. In network formation, individual or pairwise based solution concepts
such as Nash equilibrium and pairwise stability (see Jackson and Wolinsky (1996))
often lead to many stable networks, so that they provide broad predictions. In some
contexts this already narrows things, but in other contexts it may leave us with a
large set of networks. Moreover, these networks may have very different properties and
then additional considerations may help us to sort among them to produce narrower
and more accurate predictions of network formation. (See Examples 1 and 2, in sec-
tion 2.1 below, for illustrations.) In addition, in many contexts, there will naturally
be communication among individuals that may allow a number of them to coordinate
their choices of links. As such, we study strongly stable networks as a natural way for
making tighter predictions using coalitional considerations. One can think of a notion
such as pairwise stability as a weak stability concept which is essentially a necessary
(and some times too weak) condition for stability, while strong stability is a sufficient
(and some times too strong) condition for stability.
Strong stability of networks is a very demanding property, as it means that no set of
players could benefit through any rearranging of the links that they are involved with
(including those linking them to players outside the coalition). As such, we expect there
1For bibliographies on network study generally and network formation in particular, we refer the
reader to Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001a), Dutta and Jackson (2003), and Jackson (2004).
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to be contexts where such networks will not exist. However, strongly stable networks
still exist in a number of natural settings, including some that pop up in the literature
as examples of network situations. In situations where strongly stable networks exist
they are quite compelling, in the sense that once formed such networks are essentially
impossible to destabilize, as there is no possible reorganization that would be improving
for all of the players whose consent is needed.
Another reason for examining the existence of strongly stable networks, beyond
their compelling stability properties, is that such networks exhibit additional prop-
erties. For instance, as we shall show, if a network is strongly stable and has more
than one component, then value must be allocated equally among members of each
component, and in fact the per capita value must be equal across components. This is
a very strong equity property. More importantly, strongly stable networks have strong
efficiency properties. One obvious property is Pareto efficiency. But if the value of each
component of a network is allocated equally among the members of that component
of a network, then when strongly stable networks exist they exhibit even stronger effi-
ciency properties. In this case, strongly stable networks maximize the overall value of
the network. This statement actually takes a bit of proof as we shall show. Although it
is obvious if a network consists of just one component, it is more subtle when efficient
networks consist of several components.
Motivation for the study of the existence of networks that are efficient and satisfy
some stability requirement comes out of the previous literature. From previous re-
search, we know that there are a variety of contexts where the stability of networks can
be at odds with efficiency. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) show that for some settings the
sets of pairwise stable networks and efficient networks do not intersect. Moreover, for
some value functions they showed that this is true regardless of how value is allocated
or transferred among players, provided the allocation respects component balance and
anonymity (which are formally defined below). Jackson (2003) goes on to show that
even a weaker form of efficiency is at odds with pairwise stability, and that in some
very natural contexts even Pareto efficiency can be widely incompatible with pairwise
stability.
The tension between stability and efficiency suggests several directions for further
study. One is to examine whether the tension disappears if we are free to construct the
allocation rule in careful and non-anonymous ways. This angle is pursued by Dutta and
Mutuswami (1997) who show that careful construction of allocation rules that may be
non-anonymous (on unstable networks) can restore the compatibility between efficiency
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and stability.2 Another direction is to identify specific classes of value functions and/or
allocation rules for which there is no tension between stability and efficiency (or at
least for which there is an overlap between the two) when keeping with anonymity.
That direction is pursued both in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Jackson (2003),
when the concept in question is pairwise stability. The current paper is in that same
spirit, but moves beyond pairwise stability to strong stability. As we shall see, efficient
networks and strongly stable networks will coincide when the latter exist. Of course,
the existence of strongly stable networks is of interest beyond efficiency, given that such
networks are robust to all kinds of deviations, as we have already discussed above.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we provide definitions and
examples in which we compare strong stability to pairwise stability. In Section 3
we first show that the existence of strongly stable networks requires an egalitarian
allocation. Next, we characterize the existence of strongly stable networks under the
component-wise egalitarian allocation rule in terms of nonemptiness of the core of a
closely related cooperative game. We use this in Section 4 to obtain a characterization
of the value functions for which there exist strongly stable networks, showing that a
“top convexity” condition is both necessary and sufficient. We provide applications
of these results to a variety of settings. In Section 5 we move on to consider side
payments, showing that the characterizations in the previous sections relating to the
component-wise egalitarian allocation rule are in fact necessary for any allocation rule
when strong stability allows for side payments. Finally, we close the paper with some
results on non-anonymous value functions in Section 6 and some concluding remarks
in Section 7. The proofs of all results are collected in the appendix.
2 Definitions
Networks
There is a set N = {1, . . . , n} of players who may be involved in network relation-
ships.
2Another interesting direction, not as closely related to what we examine here, is to study situations
where the allocation rule and networks are formed simultaneously and endogenously. This is explored
in Currarini and Morelli (2000), Mutuswami and Winter (2002) and Slikker and van den Nouweland
(2001b). As shown by Currarini and Morelli (2000), at least for some bargaining protocols, efficiency
can be regained in some settings.
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Non-directed graphs are used to model the network relations between players.3
In such a graph the nodes (vertices) correspond to the players and the links (edges)
correspond to bilateral relationships between players. Let gN be the set of all subsets
of N of size 2, and similarly for any S ⊆ N let gS be the set of all subsets of S of size
2. G = {g | g ⊆ gN} is the set of all possible networks or graphs on N .
The link between players i and j is denoted by ij.
A network g induces a partition Π(g) of the player set N , where two players i and
j are in the same partition element if and only if there exists a path4 in the graph
connecting i and j (using the convention that there is a path from each player to him
or herself).
A network g is connected if Π(g) = {N}. For any S ∈ Π(g), g(S) denotes the
subgraph of g on the set S, i.e. g(S) = g ∩ gS.
The components of a network g, denoted C(g), are defined by C(g) = {g(S)|S ∈
Π(g), |S| ≥ 2}. The restriction that |S| ≥ 2 rules out empty networks as components.
The Value of a Network
The value of a network is given by a value function v : G → IR. We normalize v so
that v(∅) = 0. The set of all such value functions is denoted V .
A value function is anonymous if for any permutation of the set of players π (a
bijection from N to N), v(gπ) = v(g), where gπ = {π(i)π(j)|ij ∈ g}.
Anonymity says that the value of a network is derived from the structure of the
network and not the labels of the players who occupy certain positions. For many of
the results we will restrict our attention to anonymous value functions, and we discuss
extensions to non-anonymous value functions in a later section of the paper.
A value function is component additive if v(g) =
∑
h∈C(g) v(h) for all g ∈ G.
Component additivity precludes that the value of a given component of a network
depends on how other components are organized. This precludes externalities across
components of a network. However, it still allows for externalities within components.
That is, the value of a given component, and ultimately each player’s payoff, can depend
on the way that the component is structured. For example, the value of {12, 23} can
differ from that of {12, 23, 13}, and so, for instance, player 2’s payoff may depend on
whether 1 and 3 are linked.
3For some analysis of network formation in directed networks see Bala and Goyal (2000) and Dutta
and Jackson (2000). The general problem of strong stability in directed networks has not been studied.
4Formally, a path in g from i to j is a sequence of players i1, . . . , iK such that ikik+1 ∈ g for each
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}, with i1 = i and iK = j.
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Allocation Rules
An allocation rule is a function Y : G × V → IRn that describes how the value of
a network is distributed among the players. The payoff of player i ∈ N in network g
with a value function v under allocation rule Y is denoted Yi(g, v).
The allocation function may represent payoffs that accrue to individuals directly, or
might also represent additional transfers of value among players. We can be agnostic on
whether the allocation rule simply reaffirms individually-earned payoffs, is derived from
some bargaining among players, or is forced by some government or other intervening
party.
An allocation rule Y is anonymous if for any v ∈ V , g ∈ G, and permutation of
the set of players π, Yπ(i)(g
π, vπ) = Yi(g, v), where the value function v
π is defined by
vπ(g) = v(gπ
−1
) for each g ∈ G.
Anonymity of an allocation rule requires that if all that has changed is the la-
bels of the players and the value generated by networks has changed in an exactly
corresponding fashion, then the allocation only change according to the relabeling.
An allocation rule Y is component balanced if
∑
i∈S Yi(g, v) = v(g(S)) for each
component additive v, g ∈ G and S ∈ Π(g).
Component balance requires that the value of a given component of a network is
allocated to the members of that component in cases where the value of the component
is independent of how other components are organized. This means that in situations
where there are no externalities across components with respect to value, there is no
cross-subsidization of components with respect to allocations either. It is a condition
that an intervening planner or government would like to respect if they wish to avoid
secession by components of the network.
An allocation rule Y is component decomposable if Yi(g, v) = Yi(g(S), v) for each
component additive v, g ∈ G, S ∈ Π(g), and i ∈ S.
Component decomposability requires that in situations where v is component ad-
ditive, the way in which value is allocated within a component does not depend on
the structure of other components. So, in situations where there are no externalities
across components, the allocation within a component is independent of the rest of the
network. The idea behind component decomposability is that in situations where there
are no externalities across components, a given component can bargain or decide its
allocation of value without attention to the outside structure of the network as it has
no effect on the given component. In fact, the members of a given component might
not even be aware of the outside structure of the network, especially since this only
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applies in situations where the outside structure is completely inconsequential to the
given component.
Some simple examples show that component balance and component decompos-
ability are mutually independent. Suppose there are 5 individuals and consider the
component additive value function according to which components with two links have
value 6 and all other components have 0 value. An allocation rule for this situation
that is anonymous and component balanced but not component decomposable is one
that gives a payoff of 0 to every player who is not in a component with two links, that
gives 2 to every player in the component with two links if this is the unique component
of the network, and that in a network consisting of one component with one link and
one component with two links gives 4 to the middle player in the two-link component
and 1 to the two other players in this component. An allocation rule for this situation
that is anonymous and component decomposable but not component balanced is one
that gives 2 to every player in a two-link component, 1 to every player in a one-link
component, and 0 to players who are not in a one-link or a two-link component.5
Given any component additive v ∈ V , the component-wise egalitarian allocation
rule Y ce is defined by
Y cei (g, v) =
v(g(Si))
|Si| ,
where Si ∈ Π(g) is the unique partition element containing player i. Y ce splits the
value v(g) equally among all players if v is not component additive.
The component-wise egalitarian rule is one where the value of each component is
split equally among the members of the component; provided this can be done - i.e.,
within the limits of component additivity. This allocation rule is anonymous, compo-
nent balanced, and component decomposable, and satisfies nice egalitarian properties
in terms of equalizing payoffs.
As we shall see, this allocation rule will surface if one wishes to have strongly stable
networks, and will play a key role in the characterization of value functions that allow
such networks.
Efficiency and Stability Notions
A network g is efficient with respect to v if v(g) ≥ v(g′) for all g′ ∈ G.
5Note that the allocation rule described here violates ‘overall balancedness’ because∑
i∈N Yi(g, v) = v(g) for some networks g. This is unavoidable, as component decomposability and
‘overall balancedness’ together imply component balancedness.
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We denote the set of networks that are efficient with respect to value function v by
E(v).
Note that an efficient network always exists since there are only finitely many
networks in G. This is a strong notion of efficiency as it requires the maximization
of total value. It only corresponds to Pareto efficiency if the value is freely and fully
transferable across all components of a network.6
The following definition of coalitional deviation is used in defining the strong sta-
bility notion.
A network g′ ∈ G is obtainable from g ∈ G via deviations by S if
(i) ij ∈ g′ and ij /∈ g implies ij ⊆ S, and
(ii) ij ∈ g and ij /∈ g′ implies ij ∩ S = ∅.
The above definition identifies changes in a network that can be made by a coalition
S, without the need of consent of any players outside of S. (i) requires that any new
links that are added can only be between players in S. This reflects the fact that
consent of both players is needed to add a link between them. (ii) requires that at
least one player of any deleted link be in S. This reflects that fact that either player
in a link can unilaterally sever the relationship. Hence, if a single player deviates
(|S| = 1), then this payer can break some or all of his links, but not form any new
links.
A network g is strongly stable with respect to allocation rule Y and value function
v if for any S ⊆ N , g′ that is obtainable from g via deviations by S, and i ∈ S such
that Yi(g
′, v) > Yi(g, v), there exists j ∈ S such that Yj(g′, v) < Yj(g, v).
We denote the set of networks that are strongly stable with respect to Y and v by
SS(Y, v).
The definition of strong stability we use here is slightly stronger (i.e., harder to sat-
isfy) than that originally introduced by Dutta and Mutuswami (1997). The definition
of strong stability here allows for a deviation to be valid if some members are strictly
better off and others are weakly better off, while the definition in Dutta and Mutuswami
(1997) considers a deviation valid only if all members of a coalition are strictly better
off. For many value functions and allocation rules these definitions coincide.
There are several reasons for working with this stronger definition of strong stability.
First, it implies pairwise stability, whereas the Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) version
6For discussion of this and some weaker notions of efficiency see Jackson (2003).
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of strong stability does not quite imply pairwise stability.7 To see this note that our
definition implies that a network is not strongly stable if a single player can strictly
increase his payoff by breaking some or all of his links or if a coalition of two or more
players can deviate to a network in which some of its members get a strictly higher
payoff while none of its members get a lower payoff. Second, this stronger definition
allows for a stronger implication in Theorem 2, where we conclude that under certain
conditions on the value function all efficient networks are strongly stable. Third, the
converse of this statement in Theorem 2 is only true with the stronger definition of
strong stability. Finally, if all members of a coalition are weakly better off and some
strictly better off, then any ability of members to make even tiny transfers will result in
a deviation. As we compare the definition of strong stability with what happens when
transfers are possible, this slightly stronger notion of stability is more appropriate.
Such differences between weak and strong inequalities are common to definitions of
Pareto efficiency, the core, strong Nash equilibrium, and coalitional stability properties;
and the difference sometimes has consequences. In working with the stronger definition
here, one ends up with a more attractive solution when it is non-empty, but in cases
where it is empty one might also wish to examine the weaker solution.
We remark that the strongly stable networks correspond exactly to the strong Nash
equilibria of the network formation game suggested by Myerson (1991). In that game
players simultaneously announce the set of players with whom they wish to be linked
and a link between two players forms if and only if both players have named each
other.8
Cooperative Games and the Core
A TU cooperative game is a pair (N,w), where N is the set of players and w : 2N →
IR defines the productive value of each subset of N . In line with this interpretation
7Pairwise stability (from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)) is defined as follows. A network g ∈ G is
pairwise stable with respect to allocation rule Y given a value function v ∈ V if no player benefits
from severing one of their links and no two players benefit from adding a link between them, with one
benefiting strictly and the other at least weakly. This last part of the definition is what makes our
version of strong stability compatible with pairwise stability but the Dutta and Mutuswami version
incompatible.
8The equivalence holds for the corresponding definition of strong Nash equilibrium which requires
that there are no deviations by a coalition that make all members weakly better off and some strictly
better off. There are some details to verify, as there are some strong Nash equilibria where one player
names another but is not reciprocated. It is easy to check that the networks formed in such equilibria
must be strongly stable networks.
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w(∅) = 0.
As we fix N throughout our analysis, we often refer to a characteristic function
w : 2N → IR as a cooperative game.
An allocation x ∈ IRN is in the core of w if ∑i∈N xi = w(N) and ∑i∈T xi ≥ w(T )
for all T ⊆ N .
2.1 A Comparison of Pairwise and Strong Stability
It is easy to see how strong stability can refine pairwise stability. For instance, consider
the following example.
Example 1 Circles
Suppose there are n ≥ 3 players. For any k ≥ 3, let a k-player circle be a network of
the form {12, 23, . . . , ii+1, . . . , k1}, or any permutation of such a network.9 Consider
a component-additive value function where the value to a component is k2 if it is a
k-person circle with k ≥ 3, and 0 otherwise. Suppose that the value of each network is
allocated according to the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule. Here, the set of
pairwise stable networks includes all of the circles of any size larger than 2, networks
consisting of several components that are such circles, possibly of various sizes, as well
as some other networks. Every circle of size k ≥ 3 is pairwise stable because it takes
changes in links involving at least three players to change the network structure to
become a larger circle, which would be the only way to increase the players’ payoffs.
The set of strongly stable networks is considerably smaller, however, as only circles
encompassing all n players are strongly stable. This is easily seen as the component-
wise egalitarian allocation rule gives k
2
k
= k to every player in a k-player circle, and
this is obviously increasing in the size of the circle. Hence, all players get the maximum
payoff possible in any network when they are in a circle of maximum size, get a lower
payoff in any other network, and they can obtain a circle of maximum size starting
from any other network.
We make two remarks about this example. First, from any network that is pairwise
stable but is not an n-player circle, there is a profitable deviation that involves exactly
three players.10 Thus, the instability of pairwise stable networks relative to coalitional
9Here, ii+ 1 denotes a link between player i and player i+ 1.
10If there are three players who are getting 0, then they can form a circle of three and all be better
off. If not, then it must be that there is some circle in the pairwise stable network that is smaller than
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deviations becomes evident with relatively small coalitions. Second, the number of
strongly stable networks is much smaller than the number of pairwise stable networks,
and this difference explodes as n grows. Thus, strong stability is a dramatic refinement.
While Example 1 illustrates the distinction between pairwise stability and strong
stability, and the potential for strong stability to refine pairwise stability, the example
is somewhat artificial in that only “circles” generate value. The following example is
one that is derived from some primitive description of how value is generated, and also
shows a refinement due to strong stability.
Example 2 A Trading Network
The following example is based on one from Jackson and Watts (2002).
The society consists of n individuals who get value from trading goods with each
other. In particular, there are two consumption goods and individuals all have the same
utility function for the two goods which is Cobb-Douglas, u(x, y) = (xy)
1
2 . Individuals
have a random endowment, which is independently and identically distributed. A
individual’s endowment is either (1,0) or (0,1), each with probability 1/2.
Individuals can trade with any of the other individuals in the same component of
the network. For instance, in a network g = {12, 23, 45}, individuals 1, 2 and 3 can
trade with each other and individuals 4 and 5 can trade with each other, but there is
no trade between 123 and 45. Trade flows without friction along any path and each
connected component trades to a Walrasian equilibrium. This means, for instance, that
the networks {12, 23} and {12, 23, 13} lead to the same expected trades. However, if
there are costs of forming links, then these two networks will lead to different costs.
The gains from trade in the network g = {12} are as follows. There is a 1
2
probability
that one individual has an endowment of (1,0) and the other has an endowment of (0,1).
They then trade to the Walrasian allocation of (1
2
, 1
2
) each and so their utility is 1
2
each.
There is also a 1
2
probability that the individuals have the same endowment and then
there are no gains from trade and they each get a utility of 0. Taking expectations
over these two situations leads to an expected utility of 1
4
.
Not accounting for the cost of links, the expected utility for an individual of being
connected to one other individual is 1
4
. The expected utility for an individual of being
the n-player circle. Consider a component that is the largest circle. Consider any player k not in that
component and any two players i and j from that component such that ij is part of the circle. Players
i, j, and k can break link ij and form links ik and jk, thereby forming a larger circle, in which each
of them is better off.
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connected (directly or indirectly) to two other individuals is
√
2
4
. It is easily checked that
the expected utility of an individual is increasing and strictly concave in the number
of other individuals that she is directly or indirectly connected to, ignoring the cost of
links.
For the purpose of illustration, consider a situation where n = 3 and the cost to a
link is slightly above 1
2
and split equally among all members of the relevant component.
In this case, there are two types of pairwise stable networks. One type is a network
with two links, so that all three players can trade with each other. The other is a
network with no links. The network with no links is inefficient, and it is only pairwise
stable since players only consider adding a link with one other player at a time - and the
costs from doing this outweigh the gains. However, if all three players can coordinate,
then adding two links makes all of them better off.11 The networks with two links are
the only networks that are strongly stable in this example.
This example is just one where strong stability provides an effective and sensible
refinement of pairwise stability.
3 The Existence of Strongly Stable Networks, Effi-
ciency and the Core
Let us begin by showing that strong stability has some particular implications about
the structure of the allocation rule that must be in place.
Theorem 1 Consider any anonymous and component additive value function v ∈ V .
If Y is an anonymous, component decomposable, and component balanced allocation
rule and g ∈ G with Π(g) = {N} is a network that is strongly stable with respect to Y
and v, then Y (g, v) = Y ce(g, v) and Yi(g, v) =
v(g)
n
for each i ∈ N .
Theorem 1 says that if a non-connected network is strongly stable, then the allo-
cation must be as it would be under the component-wise egalitarian rule and in fact
must involve an equal split of the total value of the network. Hence, a component-wise
egalitarian allocation of value will necessarily play a prominent role in the analysis of
strongly stable networks. The idea behind the proof of the theorem is quite simple and
11There are other possible reasons to think the two-link network might form as well, which have to
do with forward looking players who can anticipate the future continuations due to their actions, as
in Page, Wooders, and Kamat (2001).
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very compelling. Suppose that value is not being split equally. Then, some player in
some component (or perhaps completely disconnected) is getting a payoff below that
of some other player in some other component and could deviate together with the
other members of the second component to provide an improving deviation.
We point out that Theorem 1 only states conclusions about the allocation of value
and not about the structure of strongly stable networks that have more than one
component. It could be that the players share the value of the network equally, while
still sitting in very different positions in the network. For example, a component of
the network could be a star, in which one player has many links with each other player
and the other players have only one link each (with the central player).
The following example demonstrates that it is critical to Theorem 1 that the network
consist of more than one component.
Example 3 A Connected Strongly Stable Network.
There are three individuals. Networks with two links have value 2.5, the complete
network has value 3, and other networks have 0 value. Consider the allocation rule
where the middle player in a two link network (e.g., player 2 in {12, 23}) gets a payoff
of .1 and the other two players get a payoff of 1.2, in the complete network each player
gets 1 and in networks with at most one link each player gets 0. In this example,
any network with two links is strongly stable - and these are the only strongly stable
networks.
To see that networks with two links are strongly stable, consider (without loss of
generality) the network g = {12, 23}. There is only one player in this network who can
strictly benefit from deviating (namely player 2), as the other two players are getting
the maximum that they can get in any network. But to deviate to a network in which
he gets more than .1, player 2 needs other players to deviate with him. However, in
any network in which player 2 gets more than .1, either player 1 or player 3 gets less
than 1.2 (or both). Hence, at most one of these other players will deviate with player
2. So, consider a deviation from g by players 1 and 2. The only network in which
player 2 gets more than .1 and player 1 gets at least 1.2 is g′ = {13, 23}. However,
g′ is not obtainable from g via deviations by players 1 and 2 because players 1 and 2
cannot form the new link 13 without player 3’s cooperation. To see that there are no
other strongly stable networks than those with two links, note that starting from a
network with fewer links, all players can strictly improve their payoffs by forming the
complete network, and that starting from the complete network, any two players can
strictly improve their payoffs by breaking the link between them.
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This shows that a connected network can be strongly stable without having its
allocation being egalitarian, which shows why Theorem 1 requires that the network have
more than one component. This example also shows that connected strongly stable
networks can be inefficient when the allocation rule is not component-wise egalitarian.
The following example illustrates the role of component decomposability in Theo-
rem 1.
Example 4 The Role of Component Decomposability.
There are n = 6 players. Let v be defined by v({12, 23}) = 10 and for any other
structure of a component (that has one link or three or more links) we let v have a value
of 0. Also, let v be anonymous and component additive, so that v({12, 23, 45, 56}) = 20
and permutations of the above networks have the corresponding values.
On efficient networks such as {12, 23, 45, 56}, set Y1({12, 23, 45, 56}) = Y3({12, 23, 45, 56}) =
Y4({12, 23, 45, 56}) = Y6({12, 23, 45, 56}) = 4, and Y2({12, 23, 45, 56}) = Y5({12, 23, 45, 56}) =
2. Also, set Y1({12, 23, 45}) = Y1({12, 23}) = Y3({12, 23}) = Y3({12, 23, 45}) = 5,
Y2({12, 23, 45}) = Y2({12, 23}) = 0. Set Y elsewhere to respect anonymity and com-
ponent balance.
Consider network g = {12, 23, 45, 56}. It is impossible for two players i and j
to deviate to a network {ik, jk} or {ik, jk, lm} in which they both would get 5, as
this would involve forming links with or breaking links between players who are not
deviating (note that any of the other players would not assist in such a deviation as
their payoffs would decrease to 0). Next, consider a deviation by a coalition of players
from network g to a network that is a permutation of g in such a way that at least one
devating player strictly improves his payoff (from 2 to 4). Then the payoff of at least
one player i must decrease from 4 to 2. This player i is involved in one link in network
g and is involved in two links after the deviation, which implies that i’s assistance is
needed to obtain the new network. This shows that there is no deviation from network
g that strictly improves the payoff of at least one deviating player without decreasing
the payoff of another deviating player. We conclude that g = {12, 23, 45, 56} is strongly
stable with respect to Y and v.
The allocation rule Y differs from the component-wise egalitarian rule for the non-
connected strongly stable network {12, 23, 45, 56}. In particular, Y is adjusted on
{12, 23} depending on how 4, 5, and 6 are linked, if at all. We have done this in such
a way as to preclude blocking by a coalition involving some players from {1, 2, 3} and
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players from {4, 5, 6}. However, the allocation rule Y violates component decompos-
ability.
Example 4 illustrates the difference between strong stability and the weaker notion
of strong stability that was introduced in Dutta and Mutuswami (1997), where a de-
viation is only valid if all deviating players get a strictly higher payoff. Consider the
value function in Example 4 and the component-decomposable allocation rule Y that
gives middle players in components with two links 2 while giving the other two players
in such a component 4 each. All players in other components get 0. Networks such as
{12, 23, 45, 56} are stable in the weaker sense of Dutta and Mutuswami, but are not
strongly stable in our sense. Clearly, Y differs from the component-wise egalitarian
rule on any network that contains a component with two links. In fact, it seems Y does
not have any particular properties besides anonymity, component decomposability, and
component balancedness and this suggests that a characterization similar to that in
Theorem 1 will be impossible to obtain when the weaker notion of strong stability is
used.
If we consider the weaker notion of strong stability and in addition allow for ar-
bitrarily small transfers among players, then we recover the result in Theorem 1. To
see this, suppose that g is a network that is not strongly stable in our sense. Consider
a deviation by a coalition S to a network g′ that leaves no member of S worse off
and improves the payoffs of some of its members. By transferring an arbitrarily small
positive amount ε from a player who has a strictly higher payoff in g′ to those players
whose payoffs remain unchanged, the payoffs of all deviating players can be increased
strictly. This shows that in a setting where small transfers are feasible, a network that
is strongly stable in the weaker sense is also strongly stable in the our sense. Hence,
the conclusions of Theorem 1 hold if we replace our notion of strong stability with the
weaker notion coupled with some arbitrarily small transfers.
Theorem 1 shows that the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule will neces-
sarily play a prominent role in the analysis of strongly stable networks and therefore
we focus on this allocation rule in what follows. This is with a loss of generality, as
Theorem 1 does not imply that the allocation of value must be egalitarian on networks
that are not strongly stable or in which all players are in a single component. For
instance, it is possible that an allocation rule splits value equally on strongly stable
networks but not on other networks. Nevertheless, the component-wise egalitarian
rule is an interesting one from many perspectives and we shall see that it has some
nice properties. We return to consider more general allocation rules when we discuss
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transfers.
Given a value function v, let the cooperative game (N,wv) be defined by
wv(S) = max
g∈gS
v(g).
Thus, every value function v ∈ V defines a cooperative game where the value of a
coalition is the maximum value it can obtain by arranging its members in a network.
Note that if v is anonymous, then wv is symmetric (so wv(S) = wv(T ) whenever
|S| = |T |). Also, if v is component additive, then wv is superadditive. That is,
wv(S ∪ T ) ≥ wv(S) + wv(T ) whenever S ∩ T = ∅.
Theorem 2 Consider any anonymous and component additive value function v ∈ V .
Some efficient g ∈ G with respect to v is strongly stable with respect to Y ce(·, v) if
and only if the core of wv is nonempty. Moreover, SS(Y ce, v) = ∅ if and only if
E(v) = SS(Y ce, v).
Theorem 2 shows that our interest in guaranteeing that a society forms efficient
networks is closely tied to the non-emptiness of the core of a related cooperative game.
This allows us to make use of the substantial knowledge on core existence in cooperative
game theory to analyze the efficiency of network formation.
Let us make a couple of remarks on the conditions in Theorem 2. First, Example 3
demonstrates that for allocation rules other than Y ce it is possible to find strongly
stable networks with one component that are not efficient. Thus, while Theorem 1
argued that egalitarian allocations are the right ones to consider on non-connected
networks, when we consider connected networks the restriction to the component-wise
egalitarian rule is important to the conclusions. Second, the equivalence between the
core and strong stability depends on the specifics of the definition of strong stability.
That equivalence does not hold if one replaces our definition of strong stability with
the stability notion in Dutta and Mutuswami (1997), where a deviation is valid only
if all members of a coalition are strictly better off. An example shows this. Consider
5 players and the following anonymous and component additive value function v. A
component with 3 players has value of 7 and a component of 2 players has value 3.
By component additivity, a network that consists of two 2-player components and one
isolated player has value 6 and a network that consists of one 2-player component and
one 3-player component has value 10. All other networks have value 0. In this setting,
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an efficient network consists of two components, one encompassing 2 players and the
other 3. Under the component-wise egalitarian rule, such a network is stable as defined
by Dutta and Mutuswami (1997). However, such a network is not strongly stable in
our sense, and it follows by standard game-theoretic arguments that the core of wv is
empty.
On a superficial level Theorem 2 seems obvious, since both strong stability and
the core notion allow for deviations by arbitrary subsets of players. However, there
are several levels on which Theorem 2 is not obvious (which can also be seen from
the proof). Moreover, these less obvious points are those which result in some of
the theorem’s power and usefulness, as we shall see later. Some of the differences
between the core and strong stability notions are as follows. Strong stability allows
for a deviating coalition to maintain links with non-deviating players (and keeps the
rest of the network intact), while the core notion requires complete separation by a
deviating coalition. This gives better opportunities for a coalition to improve under
the strong stability notion. Working in the other direction is that the core allows for
transfers to be made among players in a deviating coalition regardless of how that
coalition derives its value, while under component balance a deviating coalition under
the strong stability notion cannot make transfers across components of a new network
that is formed. With these two critical differences, there is no obvious reason to expect
the relationship outlined in the theorem to hold in general. Moreover, the last part of
the theorem shows that it is not simply that there exists a network that is strongly
stable with respect to Y ce(·, v), but that the efficient networks and strongly stable
networks with respect to Y ce(·, v) coincide.
Application to Communication Networks and Convex Games
A special class of value functions are those derived from cooperative games with
communication networks (see Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001a)). Let z be
a characteristic function that indicates the productive value z(S) of each coalition S,
which the players in this coalition can achieve if they can communicate with each other.
Communication between players can only take place along links in a communication
network g and each link in this network incurs a cost c. This then allows one to define
a value function that assigns to each network g the productive value that the players
can obtain when they have the communication channels in g available, minus the cost
of the network.
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To be specific: a given cooperative game z and cost per link c lead to the value
function vz,c ∈ V defined by
vz,c(g) =
∑
S∈Π(g)
z(S)−
∑
ij∈g
c.
In order to obtain a value function vz,c with vz,c(∅) = 0, we limit ourselves to
characteristic functions z that are zero-normalized, i.e., z({i}) = 0 for each i ∈ N .
Also, to obtain an anonymous value function we limit ourselves to so-called symmetric
cooperative games z, in which the productive value of a coalition depends only on the
size of that coalition. We write z as a function of coalition size and denote zk = z(S)
where |S| = k. Let Z denote the class of zero-normalized symmetric cooperative games.
A cooperative game z ∈ Z is convex if
∀k ≥ 2 : zk − zk−1 ≥ zk−1 − zk−2.
We can use Theorem 2 to show that for value functions derived from convex games in
the manner described above, strongly stable networks exist and are efficient.
Corollary 1 Consider any convex cooperative game z ∈ Z and any cost per link
c ≥ 0. Then E(vz,c) = SS(Y ce, vz,c).
Corollary 1 shows that Theorem 2 has powerful implications, as the class of com-
munication games with convex production and costly links is a wide class.
The proof of Corollary 1 uses Theorem 2 and the cooperative game wv
z,c
derived
from the value function vz,c. Hence, wv
z,c
(S) is the maximum value that a coalition
S can obtain by building a communication network among its members and thereby
enabling them to achieve productive value. It can be shown that the cooperative game
wv
z,c
is convex and thus has a non-empty core. This is not immediate since although z
is convex, one needs to show that the induced game is still convex when link costs are
accounted for.
The scope of Corollary 1 does not extend arbitrarily to a class of games that is
larger than the class of convex games. We demonstrate this in the following example.
Example 5 A Non-Convex Game.
Consider the cooperative 5-player game (N, z) defined by z(S) = |S| if |S| ≥ 2 and
z(S) = 0 otherwise. This game is obtained from an additive game in which each player
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contributes 1 to every coalition by setting the worth of one-player coalitions equal to 0.
Suppose that 0 < c < 1. The value function vz,c is component additive and assigns a
value 2−c to components with one link (and two players), a value 3−2c to components
with two links (and three players), a value 3− 3c to components with three links and
three players, a value 4 − 3c to components with three links and four players, and so
on. Since links are costly, an efficient network will in each component connect players
with a minimum number of links. It is now easily seen that an efficient network g
consists of two components, one with two players connected by a link and the other
with three players connected by two links. However, such a network is not strongly
stable with respect to Y ce(·, vz,c) as two of the players in the three-player component
can deviate to form a component with one link, thereby increasing each their payoffs
from 3−2c
3
to 2−c
2
. A network that is strongly stable with respect to Y ce(·, vz,c) partitions
the player set into three parts: two components that each have two players connected
by one link and one isolated player. Hence, no network that is efficient with respect
to vz,c is strongly stable with respect to Y ce(·, vz,c) and vice versa. In fact, it can be
shown that for any anonymous and component balanced allocation rule Y it holds that
E(vz,c) ∩ SS(Y, vz,c) = ∅.
4 Primitive Conditions on Value Functions
While the non-emptiness of the core of the associated cooperative game wv is an in-
teresting and useful condition, as illustrated at the end of the last section, we are also
interested in direct conditions on v which characterize the strong stability of efficient
networks. Theorem 2 is still useful in this regard, as the characterization of v’s that
allow for strongly stable networks to exist (and then coincide with efficient networks)
can be obtained through the conditions on wv.
A value function v is top convex if some efficient network also maximizes the per-
capita value among individuals.12 Formally, let p(v, S) = maxg∈gS
v(g)
|S| .
12A related condition is called “domination by the grand coalition,” as defined in the context of a
cooperative game by Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray, and Sengupta (1993). That condition requires that the
per capita value of the grand coalition be at least that of any sub-coalition. Shubik (1982, page 149)
shows that for symmetric cooperative games this condition is a necessary and sufficient condition for
nonemptiness of the core. The top convexity condition we identify here is defined for the network
setting, but is equivalent to requiring that wv be dominated by the grand coalition. In a bargaining
context, Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray and Sengupta show that this condition is equivalent to existence of
a sequence of limiting efficient stationary equilibria for each bargaining protocol in a wide class.
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The value function v is top convex if p(v,N) ≥ p(v, S) for all S.
An implication of top convexity is that all components of an efficient network must
generate the same per-capita value. To see this note that if some component g(S) of
an efficient network led to a per capita value g(S)|S| that is lower than p(v,N), then some
other component g(T ) would have to lead to a per capita value g(T )|T | that is higher than
p(v,N), which would imply that p(v, T ) > p(v,N), a contradiction of top convexity.
The following theorem shows that top convexity plays a key role in the existence of
strongly stable networks.
Theorem 3 Consider any anonymous and component additive value function v. The
core of wv is nonempty if and only if v is top convex. Thus, E(v) = SS(Y ce, v) (or
SS(Y ce, v) = ∅) if and only if v is top convex.
We remark that Example 3 shows that for connected networks if one is not working
with the component-wise egalitarian rule, then it is possible to have inefficient networks
be strongly stable, even when the value function is top convex. Thus, top convexity does
not guarantee efficiency of strongly stable networks if we look at connected networks
and non-egalitarian allocations. In addition, top convexity is not a necessary condition
for the existence of strongly stable networks when connected networks are considered
and the allocation rule can be different from Y ce.13
Theorem 3 shows that one needs strong conditions on the value function v in order
to have existence and/or efficiency of the set of networks that are strongly stable with
respect to the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule. Despite the strength of top-
convexity, it is satisfied by many v’s, and we now point out several such value functions.
Example 6 The Symmetric Connections Model
The symmetric connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is one where links
represent social relationships between individuals; for instance friendships.14 These
13This point is illustrated in the following example. There are four players. The anonymous
component-additive value function v is such that 3-player circles have value 3, 4-player stars have
value 3.6, and all other components have value 0. This value function is not top convex, as the
maximal per-capita value in 3-player networks is 1, whereas it is .9 in 4-player networks. Consider
the allocation rule where each player in a 3-player circle gets 1, the central player in a 4-player star
gets .3 and each of the other 3 players in such a star get 1.1, and all players in other components get
0. Any 4-player star is strongly stable (as well as efficient).
14For further study of variations on the connections model, see Johnson and Gilles (2000), Watts
(2001), and Jackson (2003).
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relationships offer benefits in terms of favors, information, etc., and also involve some
costs. Moreover, individuals also benefit from indirect relationships. A “friend of
a friend” also results in some benefits, although of a lesser value than a “friend,”
as do “friends of a friend of a friend” and so forth. The benefit deteriorates with the
“distance” of the relationship. For instance, in the network g = {12, 23, 34} individual 1
gets a benefit δ < 1 from the direct connection with individual 2, an indirect benefit
δ2 from the indirect connection with individual 3, and an indirect benefit δ3 from the
indirect connection with individual 4. As δ < 1, this leads to a lower benefit from
an indirect connection than a direct one. Individuals only pay costs, however, for
maintaining their direct relationships.
Formally, the payoff player i receives from network g is
ui(g) =
∑
j =i
δt(ij) −
∑
j:ij∈g
c,
where t(ij) is the number of links in the shortest path between i and j (setting t(ij) =
∞ if there is no path between i and j). The value in the connections model of a network
g is simply v(g) =
∑
i ui(g).
It is easily seen that v is top convex for all values of δ ∈ [0, 1) and c ≥ 0, so that all
networks that are strongly stable with respect to Y ce and v are efficient with respect
to v.15
We remark that Y cei (g, v) = ui(g) for some networks g. Thus, our result is not in
contradiction with the finding of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) that sometimes none of
the pairwise stable networks (under ui) are efficient in the connections model. Here the
reallocation of value under the component-wise egalitarian rule guarantees stability of
the efficient network.16 This makes clear the role of the allocation rule in the existence
of strongly stable networks.
Example 7 The Co-Author Model
The co-author model (from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)) is described as follows.
Each individual is a researcher who spends time working on research projects. If two
15The proof of Proposition 1 in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) provides some hints to the interested
reader on how to fill in omitted details. Most importantly, for intermediate cost ranges the per capita
value of the (efficient) star network is growing in the number of players in the star.
16See Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) for some additional study of the component-wise egalitarian
rule.
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researchers are connected, then they are working on a project together. The amount
of time researcher i spends on a given project is inversely related to the number of
projects, ni, that he is involved in. Formally, i’s production is represented by
ui(g) =
∑
j:ij∈g
(
1
ni
+
1
nj
+
1
ninj
)
for ni > 0, and ui(g) = 0 if ni = 0.
17 The total value is v(g) =
∑
i ui(g).
Provided that n is even, it is easily seen that v is top-convex as the efficient network
always involves pairs of players who are only linked to each other. Thus strongly stable
networks exist in this situation (under Y ce), and correspond to the networks with
evenly matched pairs. The reallocation of value under the component-wise egalitarian
allocation rule forces players to take into account the negative externalities that they
inflict upon their current co-authors when they start new projects. This prevents them
from engaging in too many projects from an efficiency point of view, as happens when
the allocation rule u is used.
If n is odd, then top convexity is violated since dropping any player increases the
per capita value obtainable. Thus, Theorem 3 implies that if n is odd then no strongly
stable network exists.18
5 Strong Stability with Side Payments
Once we allow for coalitional deviations, so presumably coalitions can coordinate their
actions, in many contexts it is reasonable to assume that they will also be able to
reallocate value. This leads to the formulation of an even stronger stability concept.
Say that g is SSS (strongly stable with side payments) relative to an allocation
rule Y and value function v if
∑
i∈S Yi(g, v) ≥
∑
i∈S Yi(g
′, v) for any S ⊆ N and g′
obtainable from g by S. We denote this set SSS(Y, v).
17It might also make sense to set ui(g) = 1 when an individual has no links, as the person can still
produce research. This is not in keeping with the normalization of v(∅) = 0, but it is easy to simply
subtract 1 from all productivities and then view u as the extra benefits above working alone.
18Note that if instead of our current definition, which only requires one player to be strictly better
off in the deviation, we were to require both players to be better off in a deviation, then there would
exist a stable network in the co-author model with an odd number of players. However, this existence
of strongly stable networks would no longer hold if we introduce any sort of side payments, as we
discuss next.
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Theorem 4 Let v ∈ V be component additive and anonymous. The following state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) there exists a component balanced allocation rule Y such that SSS(Y, v) = ∅,
(ii) there exists a component balanced allocation rule Y such that SSS(Y, v) = E(v),
(iii) E(v) = SS(Y ce, v),
(iv) E(v) = SSS(Y ce, v).
Theorem 4 reinforces the implications of Theorem 1 that component-wise egalitarian
allocation of value plays a key role in the existence of strongly stable networks, this time
including the possibility of side payments. So beyond Y ce’s natural appeal in terms
of egalitarian properties, we find that it is a key allocation rule to understand when
it comes to finding existence of strongly stable networks and strongly stable networks
with side payments.
An example shows that the result is not true if one changes SSS to SS in part (i)
or (ii) of Theorem 4.
Example 8 Strong Stability with Side Payments
There are six players. A circle encompassing all six players has value 6 and a
star encompassing four players has value 5. All other networks have value 0. For
the allocation rule Y that we describe momentarily the efficient networks (circles) are
exactly the strongly stable networks. According to Y each player gets 1 if they are in a
circle. If g is a four-person star, then the player who is the center of the star gets 0 and
the three outside players in the star each get 5
3
. Players get 0 according to Y otherwise.
For this Y , it holds that E(v) = SS(Y, v) = ∅. Under the component-wise egalitarian
rule, however, the circle is not strongly stable. Hence, E(v) ∩ SS(Y ce, v) = ∅ and the
equivalence in Theorem 4 would not hold.
If a network is SSS then it is stable in a very strong sense and so Theorem 4,
together with our other results, shows that any top convex value function v (and only
such value functions!) will have networks that are stable in very strong ways.
24
6 Non-anonymous Value Functions
So far, we have limited our attention to anonymous value functions. Let us consider
the extent to which similar results hold for non-anonymous value functions.
Theorem 5 Let v ∈ V be a component additive value function. The following state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) the core of wv is nonempty,
(ii) there exists a component balanced allocation rule Y such that SSS(Y, v) = ∅,
(iii) there exists a component balanced allocation rule Y such that E(v) = SSS(Y, v).
Moreover, top convexity of v implies each of the above and also implies that E(v) =
SS(Y ce, v).
Unlike in a setting of anonymous value functions, for non-anonymous value func-
tions top convexity of v, nonemptiness of the core of wv, and E(v) = SS(Y ce, v) are
no longer equivalent. We demonstrate this in two examples. Example 9 shows that it
is possible to have the core of wv be nonempty, while both E(v) = SS(Y ce, v) and v is
not top convex.
Example 9 The Component-Wise Egalitarian Rule for a Non-Anonymous Value Func-
tion.
Consider a setting with 3 players. The value function v is defined by v({13}) =
v({23}) = 1 and v(g) = 0 for all other g ⊆ gN .19 This value function is not top
convex, as the per-capita value in network {13} on the 2-player coalition consisting of
players 1 and 3 is higher than the per-capita value of the best network on the coalition
consisting of all three players. Yet, the core of wv is nonempty, as it contains the
allocation (0,0,1). In addition, the efficient networks are E(v) = {{13}, {23}} while
there are no strongly stable networks with respect to the component-wise egalitarian
19Note that we can interpret this example as a special case of the bilateral bargaining model of
Corominas-Bosch (2004). Here, player 3 would be the seller of a single indivisible object, and players 1
and 2 are potential buyers. A buyer and seller generate value 2 by trading the good, and trades can
only be made across linked players. Here each link between a buyer and seller costs 1. Player 3 is
essential to the transaction, while players 1 and 2 are perfect substitutes for each other.
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rule (SS(Y ce, v) = ∅). Thus, no efficient network is strongly stable (or strongly stable
with side payments) with respect to the component-wise egalitarian rule.
This example makes it clear that the component-wise egalitarian rule fails to respect
the asymmetries of this example, where player 3 has a special role as the (only) critical
player for generating value. Thus, in a sense, Y ce allocates too much to players 1 and
2 and not enough to player 3. This shows us why the relationship between the core
and strong stability now needs to be stated with respect to other allocation rules.
The next example shows that the other equivalence that held with anonymous value
functions, namely that E(v) = SS(Y ce, v) if and only if the core of wv is nonempty, or
equivalently that v is top convex, fails with non-anonymous value functions.
Example 10 Non-Anonymity and Top Convexity
Consider 4 players and define g1 = {12}, g2 = {34}, g3 = {13, 34}, and g4 =
{23, 34}. The non-anonymous value function v is defined by v(g1) = 4, v(g2) = 8,
v(g1 ∪ g2) = 12, v(g3) = v(g4) = 11, and v(g) = 0 for all other g ⊆ gN . Then,
network g1 ∪ g2 = {12, 34} is the unique efficient network and it is also the unique
network that is strongly stable with respect to Y ce and v. This shows that E(v) =
SS(Y ce, v). However, the core of wv is empty because any core element x would have
to simultaneously satisfy the requirements x1 + x2 = 4, x3 + x4 = 8, x1 + x3 + x4 ≥ 11,
and x2 +x3 +x4 ≥ 11, which is impossible. The value function also fails top-convexity.
7 Concluding Remarks
Our main results may be summarized as follows. First, Theorem 1 showed that the
component-wise egalitarian rule plays a prominent role in the study of the existence
strongly stable networks. This was reinforced in some of the other results which are,
for anonymous value functions, all captured in the following theorem.
Theorem 6 Let v be component additive and anonymous. The following statements
are equivalent:20
(i) SS(Y ce, v) = ∅,
(ii) SS(Y ce, v) = E(v),
20Note that (v) was not included in our earlier statements, but is easily seen to be equivalent given
that it is implied by (vi) and implies (i).
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(iii) the core of wv is nonempty,
(iv) v is top convex,
(v) SSS(Y ce, v) = ∅,
(vi) SSS(Y ce, v) = E(v),
(vii) there exists a component balanced allocation rule Y such that SSS(Y, v) = ∅,
(viii) there exists a component balanced allocation rule Y such that SSS(Y, v) = E(v).
Throughout our analysis in this paper we have focused our attention on component
additive value functions. These are natural in the context of some social relationships,
exchange relationships, etc., but are not so natural when different components of the
network might be in competition with each other (e.g., political or trade alliances).
On one level, once we move beyond component additive value functions, Y ce exhibits
even stronger properties. That is because under our definitions, Y ce can split value
completely evenly among all players (even across components as now component bal-
ance is no longer relevant given the lack of component additivity) and thus result in
exactly the set of efficient networks always being strongly stable. Thus strongly stable
networks always exist and coincide with the efficient networks.
This conclusion, however, depends on how one defines component balance when v is
not component additive. If one has further information about the value accruing to each
component when v is not component additive, then one could require that Y allocate
the value of each component to that component even when there exist externalities.21
With externalities, how players are arranged when some group deviates matters in
determining the value of the deviating coalition. This changes the nature of stable
networks under a variety of different stability concepts, as is nicely demonstrated in a
new paper by Currarini (2002). The general existence of strongly stable networks in
such settings is a difficult and open problem.22
Finally, once one opens the door to coalitional considerations there are a variety
of questions that one has to deal with. For instance, what about immunity to further
21The argument for doing this in the presence of externalities is not quite as clear cut as in the case
where no externalities are present, unless one assumes that no transfers are made at all.
22The problem has some similarities to the existence of core stable partitions in coalition formation
games when there are externalities. See Bloch (2001) for some discussion of that problem.
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deviations of subcoalitions, as in coalition-proof Nash equilibrium? What about reac-
tions from players not in the coalition? There are a host of such questions that have
clear analogs in defining core and coalition based equilibrium concepts, and so we do
not rehash them here. We simply mention that it will be worthwhile to investigate
what new issues they raise in the network context because the network structure adds
new features to the problem as we have already seen.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: Consider an anonymous and component additive v and any
anonymous, component decomposable, and component balanced allocation rule Y .
Consider g ∈ G that is not connected and is strongly stable. It follows from component
balance of Y that
∑
i∈N Yi(g, v) = v(g). Consider any S and S
′ ∈ Π(g) such that
S = S ′. Without loss of generality, assume that maxi∈S Yi(g, v) ≥ maxi∈S′ Yi(g, v).
Find j ∈ argmaxi∈SYi(g, v) and k ∈ argmini∈S′Yi(g, v). To prove that Yi(g, v) = v(g)n
for all i, we need only show that Yj(g, v) = Yk(g, v). Suppose, to the contrary that
Yj(g, v) > Yk(g, v). Consider a deviation by S ∪ {k} \ {j} so that k severs all links
under g, S \ {j} severs all links with j, and S ∪ {k} \ {j} form a component h′ that is
a duplicate of g(S) with k replacing j. By component decomposability and anonymity
it follows that Yi(h
′, v) = Yi(g, v) for all i ∈ S \ {j} and Yk(h′, v) = Yj(g, v) > Yk(g, v).
This contradicts the strong stability of g via a deviation by S ∪ {k} \ {j}. Thus our
supposition was incorrect. Given that Y is component balanced and Yi(g, v) =
v(g)
n
for
all i, it follows that Y cei (g, v) =
v(g)
n
for all i.
Proof of Theorem 2: The following lemma is useful.
Lemma 1 Consider an anonymous and component additive value function v ∈ V . If
the core of wv is nonempty, then x defined by xi =
wv(N)
n
for each i is in the core of
wv.
Proof of Lemma 1: Given the symmetry of wv (implied by the anonymity of
v), the core of wv is symmetric. The core is also convex by standard arguments. The
statement of the lemma follows from the convexity and symmetry of the core of wv, as
taking any x in the core and averaging all of its permutations leads to identical payoffs
of w
v(N)
n
.23
To complete the proof of Theorem 2, we prove that for any anonymous and com-
ponent additive value function v the following statements are equivalent
(1) SS(Y ce, v) = ∅,
(2) SS(Y ce, v) = E(v),
(3) the core of wv is nonempty.
23A similar proof in a different context appears in Shubik (1982, page 149).
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It is clear that (2) implies (1). We start by showing that (1) implies (3).
Suppose to the contrary that g is strongly stable with respect to Y ce(·, v), and that
the core of wv is empty. Since by supposition the core is empty, we know that Y ce(g, v)
is not a core element. Because g ∈ SS(Y ce, v), it holds that Y cei (g, v) = v(g)n for each
i (this follows by Theorem 1 when there is more than one component, and directly
otherwise). Thus, there exists a T ⊆ N such that wv(T ) > ∑i∈T v(g)n , which implies
that w
v(T )
|T | >
v(g)
n
. By the definition of wv it then follows that there exists some S ⊆ T
and g′ with S ∈ Π(g′) such that v(g′(S))|S| > v(g)n . This contradicts the strong stability of
g. So, our supposition was incorrect and the conclusion is established.
Next, let us show that (3) implies (1).
We show the stronger statement that if the core of wv is nonempty, then E(v) ⊆
SS(Y ce, v). Suppose that the core of wv is nonempty and let g be efficient with respect
to v. Define x by xi =
wv(N)
n
for each i. Then
∑
S∈Π(g) v(g(S)) = v(g) =
∑
i∈N xi =∑
S∈Π(g)
∑
i∈S xi. Also, Lemma 1 tells us that x is in the core of w
v, and so
∑
i∈S xi ≥
wv(S) ≥ v(g(S)) for each S ∈ Π(g). Hence, all weak inequalities must hold with
equality, so that
∑
i∈S xi = v(g(S)) for each S ∈ Π(g). Define a component balanced
allocation rule Y by Yi(g
′, v) = xi
v(g′(S))∑
j∈S xj
for each g′ ∈ gN , S ∈ Π(g′), and i ∈ S. With
this construction, it follows that xi ≥ Yi(g′, v) for each g′ ∈ gN and i ∈ N ; and also
that Yi(g, v) = xi for any g ∈ E(v) and i ∈ N . This implies that Yi(g, v) = xi ≥
Yi(g
′, v) for each g ∈ E(v), S ⊆ N , g′ ∈ gN reachable from g by S, and i ∈ S; which
proves that g ∈ SS(Y, v). However, note that Y (·, v) coincides with Y ce(·, v), because
Yi(g
′, v) = xi
v(g′(S))∑
j∈S xj
= v(g
′(S))
|S| for each g
′ ∈ gN , S ∈ Π(g′), and i ∈ S. We therefore
conclude that g ∈ SS(Y ce, v).
To complete the proof, let us show that (1) implies (2).
We have shown above that E(v) ∩ SS(Y ce, v) = ∅ implies (3) and that (3) implies
that E(v) ⊆ SS(Y ce, v). Thus, we know that E(v) ∩ SS(Y ce, v) = ∅ implies E(v) ⊆
SS(Y ce, v). Next, we argue that (1) implies ∅ = SS(Y ce, v) ⊆ E(v). Consider a
strongly stable g. If it is not efficient, then there exists g′ such that v(g′) > v(g). It
follows that there exists some S ∈ Π(g′) such that v(g′(S))|S| > v(g)n . Since, as argued
above Y cei (g, v) =
v(g)
n
for all i, this contradicts the strong stability of g and so we
conclude that g must be efficient. Thus, (1) implies both SS(Y ce, v) ⊆ E(v) and
E(v) ⊆ SS(Y ce, v), which is (2).
Proof of Corollary 1: We show that wv
z,c
is convex and then the result follows from
Theorem 2 as the core of a convex game is non-empty. In what follows, we fix z and c
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and so we write w to indicate wv
z,c
, and v to indicate vz,c.
It follows directly from the definition of w and the symmetry and zero-normalization
of z that w is symmetric and zero-normalized. Thus, we can also write w as a function
wk. For each k ≤ n, let v(k) = v(g) where g = {12, 23, . . . , k − 1k}. Thus v(k) is the
value of a coalition of size k connected in a network that is a line. The function v(k)
can also be viewed as a zero-normalized symmetric cooperative game. Let X(k) =
{X ⊆ {1, . . . , k}k | k =∑k′∈X k′}. We think of breaking k into a set of integers that
sum to k, and X(k) is the set of such decompositions. We can write
wk = maxX∈X(k)
∑
k′∈X
v(k′). (1)
Since v(k) = zk − (k − 1)c for k ≥ 1, it follows from convexity of z that
v(k)− v(k − 1) ≥ v(k − 1)− v(k − 2) (2)
for every k ≥ 3. So, v is “almost” convex, except possibly that it may be that v(2) =
v(2) − v(1) < v(1) − v(0) = 0. However, by standard arguments inequality (2) still
implies that if v(k′) > 0 then v(k′ + k′′) ≥ v(k′) + v(k′′) for any k′′. This combined
with equation (1) implies that
wk = max{0, v(k)}. (3)
It then follows directly from (2) and (3) that w is convex.
Proof of Theorem 3: Suppose that the core of wv is nonempty. Then by Lemma
1, x defined by xi =
wv(N)
n
for each i is in the core of wv. Hence, for every S ⊆ N we have∑
i∈S xi = |S|w
v(N)
n
≥ wv(S) = |S|p(v, S). This results in p(v,N) = wv(N)
n
≥ p(v, S),
so that v is top convex.
Now suppose that v is top convex. It is a straightforward exercise to show that
then x defined by xi =
wv(N)
n
for each i is in the core of wv.
Proof of Theorem 4: It is clear that (iv) implies (ii) and (ii) implies (i). So we
need only show that (i) implies (iii) implies (iv). To show that (i) implies (iii), first,
note that for any component balanced Y , SSS(Y, v) ⊆ E(v). So, consider Y and g
such that g ∈ SSS(Y, v) ⊆ E(v). This implies that the vector Y (g, v) is in the core of
wv. From Theorem 2, it then follows that (iii) holds.
Next, let us show that (iii) implies (iv). Let g ∈ E(v) = SS(Y ce, v). Since we
know by Theorem 3 that v must be top-convex, it follows that Y cei (g, v) ≥ Y cei (g′, v)
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for all i and g′. Thus,
∑
i∈S Y
ce
i (g, v) ≥
∑
i∈S Y
ce
i (g
′, v) for any S and g′, and so
g ∈ SSS(Y ce, v). So we have shown that E(v) ⊆ SSS(Y ce, v). Pairing this with
SSS(Y ce, v) ⊆ E(v), it follows that SSS(Y ce, v) = E(v).
Proof of Theorem 5: First, let us show the equivalence that (i) implies (iii)
implies (ii) implies (i).
Let us show that (i) implies (iii). It is clear that for any component balanced Y ,
SSS(Y, v) ⊆ E(v) simply from considering deviations by N . Thus, we need only show
that (i) implies that there exists a Y such that E(v) ⊆ SSS(Y, v). Let g ∈ E(v)
and let x in the core of wv. Define a component balanced allocation rule Y by
Yi(g
′, v) = xi
v(g′(S))∑
j∈S xj
for each g′ ∈ gN , S ∈ Π(g′), and i ∈ S. With this construction, it
follows analogously to the part of the proof of Theorem 2 where it is proved that (3)
implies (1), that for S ⊆ N and g′ ∈ gN reachable from g by S we have∑i∈S Yi(g, v) =∑
i∈S xi ≥
∑
i∈S Yi(g
′, v). This proves that g ∈ SSS(Y, v).
It is clear that (iii) implies (ii).
We complete the equivalence proof by showing that (ii) implies (i). Let Y be a
component balanced allocation rule such that SSS(Y, v) = ∅. Since SSS(Y, v) ⊆ E(v),
we can find g ∈ E(v) ∩ SSS(Y, v). It follows directly that Y (g, v) is in the core of wv.
Next, let us show the remaining statements of the theorem. If v is top convex, then
it is a straightforward exercise to show that then x defined by xi =
wv(N)
n
for each i is
in the core of wv.
Finally, let us show that if v is top convex and component additive, then E(v) =
SS(Y ce, v). Let g ∈ E(v). Then v(g)
n
= p(v,N) = maxS⊆N p(v, S) and, hence,
v(g(S))
|S| =
v(g)
n
for each S ∈ Π(g). Then, for each i ∈ N we have Y cei (g, v) = p(v,N), the
maximum a player can get in any network. Hence, g ∈ SS(Y ce, v). This shows that
E(v) ⊆ SS(Y ce, v). To show the reverse inclusion, take g /∈ E(v). Then Y cei (g, v) ≤
p(v,N) for all i ∈ N with strict inequality for at least one i ∈ N . A g′ ∈ E(v) is
reachable from g by N , and Y cei (g
′, v) = p(v,N) for each i ∈ N . This shows that
g /∈ SS(Y ce, v).
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